1. Quantity FC VC TC AFC AVC ATC MC0 120 0 — — — —1 150 2 40 3 102.(16 total points) Suppose a firm has a production function given by Q = L1/2K1/2. Therefore,mathml equationThe firm can purchase labor, L at a price w = 15, and capital, K at a price of r = 60.a) What is the firmâs Total Cost function, TC(Q)?b) What is the firmâs marginal cost of production?3.(10 points) Suppose that a perfectly competitive firm has Fixed Cost = 30 and Variable Cost = 3q2, so that MC = 6q. What is the maximum profit this firm could make if the market price of the good is $72?4.3. (25 total points) Suppose a monopolist faces the following demand curve:P = 90 â 4Q.The long run marginal cost of production is constant and equal to $10, and there are no fixed costs.A) What is the monopolistâs profit maximizing level of output?B) What price will the profit maximizing monopolist produce?C) How much profit will the monopolist make if she maximizes her profit?D) What would be the value of consumer surplus if the market were perfectly competitive?E) What is the value of the deadweight loss when the market is a monopoly?5.(25 total points) Suppose there are two firms in a market who each simultaneously choose a quantity. Firm 1âs quantity is q1, and firm 2âs quantity is q2. Therefore the market quantity is Q = q1 + q2. The market demand curve is given by P = 160 – 2Q. Also, each firm has constant marginal cost equal to 10. There are no fixed costs.The marginal revenue of the two firms are given by:MR1 = 160 â 4q1 â 2q2MR2 = 160 â 2q1 â 4q2.A) How much output will each firm produce in the Cournot equilibrium?B) What will be the market price of the good?C) What is the deadweight loss that results from this duopoly?D) How much profit does each firm make?E) Suppose Firm 2 produced 30 units of output. How much output should Firm 1 produce in order to maximize profit?6.(14 total points) Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table:Player 1 Player 2Left RightTop 9 5 2 3Bottom 7 4 5 6where the number on the left is the payoff to Player A, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player B.A) (2 points) Does player 1 have a dominant strategy, and if so what is it?B) (2 points) Does player 2 have a dominant strategy and if so what is it?C) (1 point each) For each of the following strategy combinations, write TRUE if it is a Nash Equilibrium, and FALSE if it is not:i) Top/Leftii) Top/Rightiii) Bottom/Leftiv) Bottom RightD) (2 points) What is Player 1âs maximin strategy?E) (2 points) What is player 2âs maximin strategy?F) (2 points) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose?7.(4 points) Suppose the price of a good is $25. Also suppose the price elasticity of demand is equal to -5. What is the firmâs marginal revenue?